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Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: 
why the ‘black garden’ will not blossom any time soon 
Tobias Schumacher 
After the recent escalation of fighting 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia-backed 
separatist forces of the self-proclaimed 
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh – the 
bloodiest and most wide-ranging for the 
last 22 years – the South Caucasus has 
re-emerged in the international spotlight. 
What are the prospects of the recently 
concluded ceasefire agreement mediated 
by Russia, asks Tobias Schumacher. 
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to a complete termination of the fighting or 
contribute even to a resolution of the years-
long conflict. At least three major factors can 
explain this sobering prospect.  
 
THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT 
AS A SOURCE OF IDENTITY AND 
LEGITIMACY 
 
First, neither the authoritarian regime of 
Azerbaijani President Ilham Alijev nor the 
Armenian Republican Party, dominating the 
state apparatus and led by President Serzh 
Sargsyan, have a real interest in resolving the 
conflict. To both sides, Nagorno-Karabakh is 
too important from an identity-generating 
perspective, and too strong weigh the 
legitimacy deficits that both regimes are faced 
with. What does this mean? 
The ‘black garden in the mountains’, as the 
wild mountainous region is translated literally, 
is, according to Azerbaijani reading, the 
birthplace of Azerbaijani identity and the 
cradle of its national culture. Conversely, the 
internationally unrecognized republic, drawing 
from the military and financial support of 
Armenia, and boasting just some 150.000 
inhabitants, stands in the Armenian collective 
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So it finally happened. The conflict between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan over the separatist 
and internationally isolated mountainous 
region of Nagorno-Karabakh in the South 
Caucasus, which erupted in 1988 and escalated 
during 1991-1994 into a full-blown military 
conflict, flared up again. From 2 to 5 April 
2016 Azerbaijani forces on the one side and 
separatist forces of the self-proclaimed 
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (NKAO) on 
the other side, supported by the Armenian 
military, found themselves in major military 
clashes which, in terms of scale and casualties, 
exceeded all previous skirmishes since the 
ceasefire of 12 May 1994. This time, the 
conflict parties agreed on a renewed ceasefire, 
mediated by Russia, after just four days. Yet, as 
the recent past demonstrated, this will not lead 
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memory for the continuation and incessancy 
of the Armenian nation and identity, given its 
roots as a province in Greater Armenia at the 
turn of the second century BC. Any territorial 
concession by either side would not only result 
in a de facto and de jure loss of territory. More 
importantly, for a considerable part of the two 
populations it would correspond to a betrayal 
of the national self-conception. This is 
something that both regimes cannot afford to 
ignore, as much as the fact that the conflict is a 
viable instrument in their autocratic tool-kit 
that can be used and adjusted anytime 
depending on the domestic political and 
economic situation. 
As far as Azerbaijan is concerned, Alijev’s 
apparatus of power, and thus its power 
monopoly, has recently come under growing 
pressure as a result of its decreasing 
‘performance legitimacy’. The country, whose 
exports are comprised of 95% hydrocarbon 
goods, suffers considerably from the recent 
fall in the price of oil. Since the end of 2015 
this has led to a decline of capital reserves by 
approx. 50% and to a depreciation of the 
national currency – the manat – by 48%, both 
of which, in turn, contributed to a complete 
melting of the once impressive balance of 
payments surplus. As the hitherto financially 
self-sufficient, oil-rent-based regime suddenly 
finds itself in discussions with international 
financial institutions such as the IMF, the 
World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction over emergency loans and 
assistance packages to the private sector, it has 
come under intense domestic pressure. During 
the last months, rising food prices, 
unemployment and inflation sparked 
numerous demonstrations across the country 
which even led to violent clashes between 
protesters and the security forces. In other 
words, the social pact that was concluded by 
the undemocratic and human rights violating 
regime of Alijev, whereby opportunities for 
 economic advancement and improvements of 
living conditions were only possible in 
exchange for non-interference in domestic 
political affairs, has increasingly come under 
threat. Consequently, in such a tense and even 
hostile climate it seems natural from the 
regime’s angle to utilize the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and elevate it to a higher 
escalation level, hoping that the decreased 
legitimacy qua performance can be 
compensated and ideally turned around by 
revitalizing, and rallying support for, the fight 
for what is framed as the ‘national cause’. 
In this regard, the parallels to Armenia are 
obvious. While the country until not long ago 
was euphemistically considered by some as a 
‘Caucasian tiger’
1
, which drew quite some 
international attention due to its success in 
attracting foreign direct investment and its 
temporary fight against poverty, this has been 
reversed into its opposite since 2008.
2
 The 
global financial crisis, western sanctions against 
Russia – Armenia’s most important trading 
partner – and Russian pressure to become a 
part of the still dysfunctional Eurasian 
Economic Union have forced the hand of the 
Republican Party and President Sargsyan and 
exposed the regime to popular discontent. 
Growing poverty – every third Armenian lives 
currently below the poverty line –, the decline 
of Armenian-Russian trade in 2015, the 
depreciation of the Armenian dram and of the 
Russian ruble, the decline in remittances of 
foreign Armenian workers, a record-high 
government debt, and the resulting increase of 
living costs and electricity prices have sparked 
widespread protests in the summer of 2015, 
though – unlike in Azerbaijan – these were 
mainly confined to the national capital 
Yerevan. Societal discontent is aggravated by 
the recent adoption of a new constitution. As a 
consequence of a successful referendum, 
which de facto was characterized by ballot-
stuffing, vote buying, pressure, and even 
 3 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
violence, the new constitution foresees the 
transformation of the hitherto presidential 
system into a parliamentary one. Yet, as a 
matter of fact, it is destined to mainly serve the 
purpose of securing the power monopoly of 
President Sargsyan and the Republican Party, 
thus satisfying the elites whose support is vital 
for their political survival. Therefore, in light of 
the rampant discontent with the stagnating 
political and economic situation, any territorial 
concession in the framework of the conflict 
over Artsakh – the historic Armenian name of 
Nagorno-Karabakh – would, from the 
perspective of the ruling elite, be equivalent to 
political suicide. Moreover, taking into account 
that the conflict has been the most important 
foreign policy issue throughout the last almost 
three decades, offering a most useful source to 
increase regime legitimacy and foster the image 
of a national enemy, it becomes 
understandable why, in turn, occasionally 
violent skirmishes with Azerbaijan do play into 
the hands of the regime. 
 
ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN AND 
EXCESSIVE MILITARY SPENDING 
 
This leads directly to the second reason why 
the prospects of a lasting ceasefire, or even of a 
peace agreement, are extremely poor. Both 
Azerbaijan and Armenia have in recent years 
increased their military spending considerably 
and made every effort to enlarge their military 
arsenal and to modernize it. Azerbaijan’s 
military expenditure in relation to its total 
spending increased during the period from 
1994 to 2012 by 95%, while the defence 
budget, for example in 2015,  grew by 27% in 
comparison to 2014, amounting nowadays to 
US$4,8 billion. This corresponds to a share of 
approx. 5% of Azerbaijan’s GDP as well as 
approx. 18% of the state’s total expenditure. In 
relative terms, these figures exceed even those 
of the United States, as well as Armenia, the 
total state budget of which amounts to just 
US$3,2 billion. Notwithstanding, also Armenia 
has been in relative terms one of the biggest 
military spenders in the recent years. In 2015, 
its military expenditure was approx. US$500 
million, which corresponded to more than 21% 
of its total expenditure and an increase of 8% 
compared to 2014. Back then, the military 
spending-GDP ratio was 4.3% and thus just 
slightly below Azerbaijan’s ratio. Though these 
figures seem to speak for themselves and 
supposedly indicate Azerbaijan’s military 
supremacy, they cannot disguise the true 
balance of power. So far at least, Armenia 
always found ways and means to establish and 
maintain a military balance. As a member of 
the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO)
3
, and as a result of 
bilateral defence agreements with Russia, it has 
been benefiting from weapons’ deliveries, 
providing it with arms and equipment below 
market value or even at no cost.  
Another aspect is indivisibly linked with the 
military build-up in the South Caucasus in 
recent years that is major cause for concern. 
Instead of ‘just’ enlarging their defence 
capacities, a worrying trend can be discerned 
lately as both parties have been heavily 
investing in offensive weapons and – as the 
most recent clashes and the downing of an 
Armenian helicopter by Azerbaijani forces in 
November 2014 clearly demonstrated – 
lowered their inhibition threshold to use them. 
For example, already last year Russia promised 
Yerevan the delivery of Iskander-M missiles, 
which would theoretically enable Armenia to 
target Azerbaijan’s oil and gas installations. In 
turn, Azerbaijan’s military is nowadays using – 
as was demonstrated in the recent clashes – the 
ultra-modern Russian TOS-1 ‘Solntsepyok’ 
system as well as weaponized Orbiter-2 drones, 
and it nowadays possesses – as could be seen 
during the Azerbaijan International Defence 
Exhibition and Conference in September 2014 
– more than 900, locally manufactured, yet 
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highly competitive arms and material. 
THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AS 
A POWERFUL INSTRUMENT IN RUSSIA’S 
FOREIGN POLICY TOOL-KIT 
The third reason why the recent ceasefire will 
not be sustainable and thus not conducive to a 
potential resolution of the conflict is the role of 
Russia. Regarding politics as a zero-sum game 
and through the prism of power calculations, the 
Kremlin leadership, at least thus far, does not 
see any reason why it should engage itself in 
pushing the conflict parties towards a peace 
settlement. In particular in recent years, Putin 
benefited from the conflict in so far as it enabled 
him to leave the opposing sides in a constant 
state of insecurity, to fuel the conflict through 
weapons deliveries to either side depending on 
his liking and the evolving dynamics on the 
ground (or through the threat of refraining from 
such supplies), and to even profit financially 
from these deliveries. By means of Russia’s 
troops’ presence in the Armenian city of Gyumri 
and Armenia’s military dependency on Russia, 
Putin has a mechanism at its disposal that allows 
him at any time to limit the Armenian regime’s 
room for manoeuvre, to commit it to Moscow 
and to preclude it from drifting closer towards 
western structures – as was the case in 
September 2013 when Sargsyan was ‘requested’ 
to abandon the country’s path towards partial 
integration into EU-European structures. 
Though Russia’s leverage vis-à-vis Azerbaijan is 
less developed, also Baku, at least until the 
establishment of a more self-sufficient national 
weapons industry, has been dependent on solid 
relations with Moscow, most of all in order to 
expand its pre-emptive strike capacity and to 
benefit from corresponding technology 
transfers. Moreover, Russia continues to remain 
in a position to project its military power: on the 
one hand through its well-equipped North 
Caucasus contingent and the presence of its 
Caspian flotilla, which nowadays features also 
some of the latest state-of-the-art Buyan-M 
missile corvettes. On the other hand through 
the illegal annexation of Georgian territory in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which enables 
Russia to potentially interrupt Azerbaijani 
hydrocarbon exports to Europe, thereby 
berefting the regime of vital revenues.  
In other words, the conflict in Nagorno-
Karabakh joins the ranks of other unresolved 
conflicts in Russia’s neighbourhood, notably in 
eastern Ukraine, in Crimea, South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia and Transnistria, as the Kremlin 
regards their preservation and occasional 
incitement as a viable tool to preserve its 
supposedly hegemonic influence in the post-
Soviet space more generally and over domestic 
political developments in its neighbourhood 
countries in particular. Though this calculus is 
connected with enormous risks, which could 
generate, both domestically and geo-
strategically, unpredictable political and 
material costs, no regional actor has hitherto 
managed to escape from Russia’s power 
projections or to even delink itself from 
Moscow’s neo-imperial efforts. 
CONCLUSIONS: THE DARK FUTURE OF 
THE ‘BLACK GARDEN’ 
Whether this remains to be the case also in the 
mid-term in what regards the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict seems to be rather less 
predictable than it was one year ago, given the 
changing geopolitical developments in Russia’s 
wider neighbourhood. In light of the massive 
deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations after 
the downing of a Russian fighter jet in 
November 2015 and the corresponding 
rhetoric muscle flexing of the rather 
uncompromising Mr. Putin and Mr. Erdogan, 
it is to be feared that the South Caucasus 
might even become the venue of a proxy war 
of sorts. In how far the recently uttered and 
rather explicit declarations of support on the  
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part of Erdogan and the existence of a strategic 
partnership and mutual assistance pact between 
Turkey and Azerbaijan motivated the pressured 
regime of Alijev to turn its aggressive war rhetoric 
as regards the separatist region of Nagorno-
Karabakh and its patron Armenia into military 
action is subject of speculation. This applies also 
to the question of whether Armenia feels 
encouraged by the perspective of Russian 
weapons deliveries and the prospect of close 
economic relations with Iran, which is determined 
to re-enter the regional and international stage, to 
militarily confront Baku. However, three 
observations are incontestable. 
Firstly, the observation of, and adherence to, the 
Basic Principles of the Minsk Process – which 
since 1994 and under the leadership of the OSCE 
Minsk Group is supposed to lead to a lasting 
solution of the conflict – that German chancellor 
Angela Merkel, in the presence of Armenian 
President Sargsyan, demanded on 6 April 2016 in 
Berlin are incompatible with one another.
4
 
Armenia’s insistence on Nagorno-Karabakh’s 
right to self-determination and Azerbaijan’s 
insistence on the principle of territorial integrity 
continue to be diametrically opposed to one 
another also 22 years after the initiation of the 
Minsk Process. This is aggravated by the fact that 
Azerbaijan was never sympathetic to the Minsk 
format and that both sides throughout the years 
never demonstrated any determination to grab 
chances – as for example in Kazan in 2011 – to 
end the conflict. 
Secondly, even in the event that the recent 
ceasefire will be observed, the outlined mélange 
of intervening variables render any short- to mid-
term conflict resolution settlement impossible. As 
long as Russia considers to treat its 
neighbourhood as its exclusive sphere of 
influence, and remains determined to domesticate 
it by lawful and unlawful means, and as long as 
hard security-oriented world views, rooted in  
 
democracy-averse thinking and practices, 
continue to dominate in Yerevan and Baku 
alike, an externally mediated or even imposed 
peace process is unthinkable. In fact, the 
friendly and in many cases even close relations 
of some western countries with both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan are often rather complicating 
than facilitating any process towards a lasting 
settlement. In this sense, US military aid to 
Armenia, Paris’ Treaty on Concord and 
Cooperation with Yerevan, Armenia’s and 
Azerbaijan’s participation in NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace initiative, or the 
intensification of EU energy relations with 
Azerbaijan, supposedly leading to the country’s 
inclusion into the EU Energy Community, 
have provided the Armenian and the 
Azerbaijani regime respectively with valuable 
external legitimacy, thus indirectly feeding into 
their respective conflict-specific approaches 
and narratives. 
Thirdly, the recent developments have 
demonstrated once more that it is misleading 
and in fact irresponsible to speak of Nagorno-
Karabakh as a ‘frozen conflict’ as there have 
always been smaller or larger skirmishes along 
the line of contact and beyond throughout the 
last 22 years, regularly causing casualties on 
both sides. Furthermore, both conflict parties 
succeeded in using these skirmishes 
systematically to implant the alleged 
unsolvability of the conflict in the minds of 
large parts of their respective societies instead 
of sensitizing them gradually for a potential 
peace process. In light of the recent territorial 
gains by Azerbaijan there is every indication 
that the next military confrontation is just 
around the corner as Armenia is unlikely to 
tolerate them for long. Also, it is rather likely 
that the international community continues to 
be condemned to its role of a background 
actor that on the one hand has been 
demanding peace and stability for 22 years, 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Endnotes 
1 See Saumya Mitra, Douglas Andrew, Gohar Gyulumyan, Paul Holden, Bart Kaminski, Yevgeny Kuznetsov, Ekaterine 
Vashakmadze, The Caucasian Tiger. Sustaining Economic Growth in Armenia, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Press, 
2007. 
 
2 While foreign direct investment in Armenia reached an all time high of US$425,89 million in the fourth quarter of 
2008, it recorded a net outflow of US$7,5 million in the last quarter of 2015.   
 
3 Azerbaijan has left the CSTO in 1999 after refusal to sign an extension to the treaty. The CSTO has no obligation to 
defend the NKAO as its members have never recognized it.  
 
4 The OSCE Minsk Group is composed of Russia, the United States of America and France, all of which since 1997 act as 
co-chairs, and of Belarus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Armenia and Azerbaijan. On a rotating basis, also the OSCE 
Troika is a permanent member. 
  
  
while on the other hand – Sargsyan’s state visit 
in Berlin on 6 April 2016 demonstrated this 
visibly – has regularly been held to ransom by 
the conflicting sides. 
 
 
competition in and around Europe evolves 
further, the importance of SOF therefore 
continues to increase. 
 
In contemporary NATO doctrine, special 
operations forces serve three principal tasks. 
First, they can be used for special reconnaissance. 
Across the full range of operations, SOF provide 
military commanders and political decision-
makers with discreet or covert situational 
awareness within any given theatre. Second, they 
can be used for executing direc  action against
specific targets or for achieving specific 
objectives. Such missions can range from 
hostage rescue and evacuation missions to 
sabotage and counterterrorism raids. Thirdly, 
they can be used for a wide range of military 
assistance duties. This includes the training and 
mentoring of local security forces. As such, 
military assistance co stitutes a continuum that 
ranges from the special to the conventional. All 
three tasks are executed by small teams of highly 
trained operators. These are often supported by 
extensive intelligence links, civil affairs specialists 
and commando units, all tailored to meet what 
the specific mission requires. Also, they rely on 
state-of-the-art equipment, especially with 
regards to secure communication links. 
 
In recent years, the Belgian Special Forces 
Group and paracommando battalions have 
engaged in all three of these tasks. While open-
source operational details are scarce, a few 
examples help illustrate their use. In 2008, 
Belgium deployed its special forces to eastern 
Chad to ensure a proper intelligence picture for 
the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation. For several 
months, it provided the combined joint special 
operations component command within the 
mission (Clerix 2009). In 2010, a team of special 
forces was sent to the Ivory Coast with the task 
of protecting the Belgian embassy (Knack 2010). 
At the time, heavy fighting was taking place in 
Abidjan and all borders and airspace were 
officially closed, thus requiring a covert insertion 
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